

Mr. Bruce Clark

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The RAND Corporation

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5 February 1968

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Instructions on File

Dear Ivan:

(U) The purpose of this letter is to convey some ideas with regard to the next meeting of the group. Given the now hoped for date of 15 and 16 March, there should be time for you to arrange with CIA (perhaps also with other parts of the intelligence community) for the preparation of appropriate briefings, materials, attendance of experts, etc. The delay in the meeting date may also allow the clearance problems of the consultants to be cleared up. However, if not, I think that the subject matter suggested below can be pursued at current clearance levels.

(U) While the first meeting of the group may have appeared very diffuse, and not concentrated enough on problems of your immediate interest, I think that there is still some need to continue to give the three newcomers to the field more of a background. As you will see below, the program I suggest is largely a continuation in that direction. But it is, hopefully, a good deal more focused near to your interests.

(U) Jim March has seen the suggested program and is in agreement with it. I will try to circulate it to the other consultants in some form to get their reactions. However, as it stands it should offer a basis for discussion with Bruce Clarke and his people and the start of preparations for the mid-March meeting.

(U) One thing to keep in mind in setting up the next meeting is that the one hour per briefing format is probably too confined. I suggest about two hours per subject area, much of the time devoted to questions. I will be glad to come back later this month if you think that I can be of any help in organizing things. Otherwise, I will plan to write up some general ideas that I have on how we ought to proceed with regard to the whole effort and circulate them to the other consultants. The objective would be to stimulate them to think about how best to approach the subject. I would also hope that by restating again your interests and objectives, as well as sketching out alternative kinds of output that might be useful, I can focus the interest of the consultants a little better.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. I. Selin

-2-

5 February 1968
L-2385

(U) In what follows I have divided the material into four briefings, however, alternative arrangements are clearly possible. I have also tried to indicate some of the kinds of questions contributors to each of the sessions ought to be prepared to deal with. Where I have thought it useful I have tried to indicate the motivation I have for suggesting the particular briefing and subject matter.

Materials to Read at the March Session

(U) As a follow-up to the material that we heard about last time, it would be good if somewhat more elaborate charts and tables on the formal organization of the Soviet military establishment could be prepared. If possible they should cover not only the present organization, but also the organization at earlier dates: perhaps the late '40s or early '50s and the middle or late '50s. The people making them probably know the best times. These charts should indicate through the use of some device the different relationship amongst the parts as regards command subordination, administrative subordination, etc. With regard to administrative subordination there might have to be some differentiation for different aspects of the administrative subordination: for example, personnel policy, programming and planning of force levels, etc. It would also be good if there were attached to the sub-parts of the organizations an indication of manpower and expenditure for that subportion of the organization.

(U) All of the consultants are expert readers of organization charts and I think no further briefing need be prepared on this matter.

Suggested Briefings for the March Session

(C) 1. Briefings on the detailed history of the FVO and strategic rocket forces. As part of a program to continue building up the background of the consultants, I think that we should expose them to very detailed histories and chronologies of those two parts of the Soviet forces of most interest to you. Whether to split them into two separate briefings should probably be left to those preparing this part of the program.

(C) The organizational histories of the FVO and SRF should be included, covering their history not only from the time they were formed as separate organizations, but also the history of the antecedent subparts that were put together when the organizations were formed. In particular in the case of the FVO it might be well to go back to the late '40s and talk about the organization of the air defense forces then and of the events leading up to the formation of the FVO in the middle '50s. The briefings should also cover the evaluation of the force posture, including the number of personnel in the organization (by subparts if possible), weapon systems, and the related R&D program. There may be also interesting to feasible aspects of the deployment of new weapon systems such as the SA-2 system during the late '50s. If possible, it would be good for

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. I. Selin

-3-

5 February 1968
L-2385

the briefings to note critical events in the history of the PVO and SRP, that is, turning points, crises that shaped their future development. If it is possible to discern any it would be interesting to know of any reactions to U.S. or NATO moves. For example, what impact did the Cuban crisis have on these forces, etc.? How were they involved, if at all?

(C) In the case of the strategic rocket forces it might also be good to have an indication of the relationship of these forces to the Long Range Air Force. What effect did the development of the strategic rocket forces have upon the Long Range Air Force?

(C) 2. The associated design bureaus of the strategic rocket forces. A hypothesis Jim March and I have been talking about since the meeting is that the behavior and output of organizations producing new technology and weapons designs may lead the formation of strategy. It is quite conceivable that innovation comes up from below instead of being directed from above in accordance with some overall strategy or design. In this case it would be useful to know as much as we can about the design bureaus and the whole R&D process that leads to new missile programs. Because of your interest it might be well to confine our interest to the design bureaus and R&D apparatus in the long range missile area. It might be worthwhile to draw upon analogies with the functioning of the major aircraft design bureaus if not enough is known about the missile design bureaus.

(U) I think it would be good to have a general description of their functioning, as far as we know it with regard to development of new weaponry. Where do requirements come from? How, if at all, are they made known to design bureaus? Are the design bureaus free to produce designs and try to push them even when there is no stated requirement? Why is an idea for a new design accepted? Who accepts a project? How do resources get allocated to a project? Are projects ever cut once started? If so when, for what reasons? If not (after some stage) why not?

(U) A detailed interpretation of the missile R&D programs of the past in relation to the operations of the two or three design bureaus that produce (or coordinate) missile designs would be useful. It would also be interesting to know to what extent there is evidence of emulation of U.S. technology in the history of the Soviet program. To what extent do they emulate the U.S. rather than design forces to conform to some centrally directed plan.

(C) Joe Krieger of RAND pointed out to me a recent issue of Pravda, January 20, 1968, p. 6. There is an article there taken from a book on the early days of the Soviet space program. The book is by A. Ivanov entitled Four First Steps, published in Moscow. CIA may have picked up a copy of this book and if translations were available, it might be interesting reading. Can we get some copies? I gather from Joe that one gets a sense that Soviet missile development may be quite parallel in some features to the operation of aircraft design bureaus. In particular the degree to which particular design bureaus are dominated and run by illustrious individual designers may be the same. A description of this whole way of running things might be quite useful to our purpose.

Dr. I. Selin

-4-

5 February 1968

L-2385

(C) It has been said that there are two or three main design bureaus feeding new R&D programs into the Soviet missile program. Each one having been initially part of a different part of Soviet industry; one in the aviation industry, one in the tractor and truck industry, another from some other place. Can more detail be obtained about that story?

(C) 3. History of the development and deployment of the SS-11. We should finally focus in on something of substantial interest to you. You suggested the SS-11. I think a very detailed history of the initiation, research and development, and procurement and deployment aspects of the SS-11 would be a way to start. It would be important, I think, to know whether specific subparts of the SS-11 come from separate design bureaus, for example, the guidance system, propulsion, and the structure. If possible one would like to know something about the budgeting and planning process at various stages of this missile program. Can we say anything about the budgeting and planning process in the defense plants where the missiles are likely to have been constructed? Can we say anything about the planning and budgeting process within the strategic rocket forces? Can anything be said about the where in the overall structure of the Soviet forces various types of planning and programming take place? What about the coordination with the people who construct the sites, how is this done? What sorts of information is exchanged between the design bureaus, the force planner in the strategic rocket forces, and planners elsewhere in the military establishment?

(U) 4. Promotion procedures. I think we would like to continue with our exploration of the officer corps promotion process. The objective is to find out more about the perceived awards and punishment system of the officer. How does one get ahead in the system? Perhaps more important is what kind of mistakes can you make? What can get you fired, ruin your career, get you shot? We would like to know if possible more about the actual promotion process as contrasted with the formal description of the overall process, e.g., promotions above a certain rank have to be passed on by the Council of Ministers. We are probably particularly interested in how the promotion system works at the lower ranks up through Colonel. Can we get more information about the degree to which the promotion process leads to careers largely within one of the Arms, such as the PVO, strategic rocket forces, etc. Also, when some force such as the PVO or the strategic rocket forces is formed (in part out of existing elements from other parts of the military establishment) how quickly are officer candidate schools, special academies, etc., organized for the PVO and strategic rocket forces. How soon, if at all, does an organization like the strategic rocket forces have a more or less self-sustaining career system of its own? To what extent are there continuing flows from some other sources, from other career lines, within the military establishment?

(U) Again, let me say that the main thing that I think we are interested in is getting a feel for the incentive system, the reward and punishment system, as perceived by a medium grade officer in one of the forces of interest to us.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Dr. I. Selin

-5-

5 February 1968

L-2385

(C) Let me pass on one idea that I have had that might be scheduled for a future session. If it strikes you as a particularly fruitful idea, it might be included in the next session, perhaps at the expense of one of the other briefings. The briefings outlined above aim at an improved background for the consultants. The hope is that by giving them material on Soviet military organizations they might ultimately have some insight as to the likely behavior of these organizations. Another possibility of making use of the consultants is as follows. There are these various anomalies in the Soviet force which you expanded on last time and there are particular questions and issues that concern you with regard to Soviet reactions to decisions on our part. If you put these questions and described the anomalies, perhaps you could get several parts of the intelligence community to offer their explanation, hypothesis, prediction. The consultants could, I think, produce a useful critique or discussion of the analysis and output from the intelligence people. This could take more the form of a discussion than of a critique of an official paper or estimate. The consultants might well suggest why particular hypotheses are either supported by or would be largely ruled out by what is now known about the typical behavior of large organizations, etc. What I am suggesting is that the consultants might produce more by commenting on the way current intelligence analysts, or systems analysts, are likely to try to deal with the questions you have. In particular, this might be the case because of the short time they will spend in the current effort.

(U) In any case, I have the sense that there would be substantial agreement within the group of consultants that certain kinds of behavior which may tend to be ruled out or given low weight by most people would seem to them likely or typical behavior of organizations.

(U) By the next time we meet I hope that Jim March and I will have had time to prepare a few paragraphs on the hypothesis mentioned above. It appeals to us as possibly explaining some of the anomalies you put forward at the last session. In any case we are going to think a bit more about it and hope to have something.

(U) I am going to write a letter to all of the consultants in order to try to keep them thinking a bit about the problem. I also want to raise with them the question of the scheduling for the rest of the effort. My inclination at the moment would be to think of it in the following terms: a second meeting in mid-March; a third meeting in mid-April; between the third and fourth meeting the preparation by me of a draft of observations, ideas, etc., preliminary to drafting a final report; a fourth meeting early in June, report to you on July 1. I will write the report and demand from the consultants only the right to come around and bother them to read parts of it, discuss it with them, etc. I hope that schedule meets with your expectations.

Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100410004-2

CONFIDENTIAL

Dr. I. Selin

-6-

5 February 1968

L-2385

(U) I have no specific plans to come in until a few days prior to our next meeting. However, if it should seem at all important for me to come back later this month to talk with the people preparing the briefings, I would be glad to do so. Please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

A. W. Marshall
Economics Department

AWM:ap

CC: | Mr. Bruce Clark - CIA
Dr. Morton Halperin - OSD/ISA
Dr. William Lewis - OSA/SA
Mr. Kenneth Roberts - OSD/ISA
Major General Jack E. Thomas - USAF/AFNIN

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